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(transfer index) in 14 common marmosets  (Callithrix jacchus) 
as representatives of the callitrichids. These marmosets were 
found to show higher performance than would be expected 
for their brain size, and this relative performance was also 
higher than the relative performance in capuchin monkeys. 
We outline how these effects may be due to the cooperative 
breeding system of the callitrichids, particularly the en-
hancement of behavioural and cognitive propensities asso-
ciated with shared care and provisioning. 
 Copyright © 2012 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Variation in brain size among primates correlates pos-
itively with various measures of cognitive ability, e.g. 
tool-use and social learning [Reader and Laland, 2002], 
tactical deception [Whiten and Byrne, 1988; Byrne and 
Corp, 2004] or cognitive ability more generally [Deaner 
et al., 2007]. However, large brains not only provide cog-
nitive benefits in terms of enhanced cognition, but also 
incur costs, mainly with regard to energy requirements 
and life history [Harvey and Clutton-Brock, 1985; Aiello 
and Wheeler, 1995]. Because brain tissue is metabolically 
very expensive, species need to find some way of paying 
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 Abstract 
 Various measures of brain size correlate with cognitive per-
formance; however, the fit is not perfect, which bears the 
question of whether brains also vary in efficiency. Such vari-
ation could be expected if a species faces constraints on 
brain enlargement, for example due to the impossibility of 
slowing down life history as a consequence of predator pres-
sure, while simultaneously experiencing selective benefits 
from enhanced cognitive ability related to particular ecolog-
ical or social conditions. Arguably, this applies to callitrichid 
monkeys and would lead to the prediction that their rela-
tively small brains are particularly efficient in comparison to 
their sister taxa,  Cebus . This study investigated whether cal-
litrichids’ cognitive performance is better than would be ex-
pected given their brain size rather than comparing absolute 
performance between the taxa. As a measure of cognitive 
performance, we used the reversal learning paradigm, which 
is reliably and closely associated with brain size across pri-
mate taxa, and assessed performance in this paradigm 
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this energetic cost in order to afford a larger brain [Isler 
and van Schaik, 2006], as for example through trade-offs 
in metabolism, increasing their total energy turnover or 
additional energetic inputs to the developing brains by 
cooperative breeding [Isler and van Schaik, 2009; Na-
varrete et al., 2011].
 Additionally, brain enlargement has concomitant ef-
fects on life history: bigger brains slow down develop-
ment, which has to be compensated for by longer repro-
ductive adult life spans [Harvey and Clutton-Brock, 1985; 
Ross, 2004; Isler and van Schaik, 2009]. However, not all 
species can afford a slow life history: small body size 
makes animals disproportionately vulnerable to preda-
tion [Cheney and Wrangham, 1987; Isbell, 1994] and sur-
vival highly unpredictable due to high predator pressure 
favouring fast life histories [Janson, 2003]. Consequently, 
a main constraint on brain enlargement is small body size 
and its associated fast life history [Barrickman et al., 
2008] – small-bodied species facing high predator pres-
sures simply cannot afford to evolve bigger brains despite 
the potential benefits of cognitive enhancement.
 One possible way to compensate for this constraint 
may be to evolve particularly efficient brains, i.e. brains 
that provide higher levels of cognitive performance per 
volume unit. However, this does not mean that we should 
expect all brains to perform at the same maximum level 
of efficiency; instead, every brain is as efficient as it needs 
to and can be, given phylogenetic constraint, physiologi-
cal and behavioural strategies adopted by particular lin-
eages, current adaptive pressures and ontogeny. These ul-
timate factors result in trade-offs that lead to optimiza-
tion of certain traits at the cost of others [Aiello and 
Wheeler, 1995; Isler and van Schaik, 2009]. Because the 
conditions that determine what needs to be present for 
survival differ from species to species, it should come as 
no surprise that efficiency may differ between them as 
does metabolism [Glazier, 2005] and vision [Jacobs, 2008, 
2009].
 Approaches that correlate brain size with measures of 
cognitive ability acknowledge that there is also always 
a proportion of variation that remains unexplained 
[Schoenemann, 2006]. This is because brains not only 
differ in size, but also with respect to other factors such 
as connectivity, receptor density or organization [Barton 
and Harvey, 2000; Schoenemann et al., 2005; Herculano-
Houzel et al., 2007]. Variation in such factors likely re-
sults in differences in brain efficiency. This alternative 
should be pursued whenever a species strongly relies on 
cognitive survival skills but at the same time faces serious 
constraints on further brain enlargement.
 Within mammals, primates in general show an evolu-
tionary history of brain enlargement [Jerison, 1973; Mar-
tin, 1990; Boyd, 2006] and commonly show larger brain 
sizes than equally sized mammals of other orders [Finlay 
et al., 2001; Martin, 1990]. This suggests that primates 
have opted for cognitive survival strategies, compared, 
for an extreme example, with low energy expenditure 
strategies such as found in species of the order Pilosa 
(sloths and their relatives) [McNab, 1978; Nagy and Mont-
gomery, 1980]. Primates therefore are a particularly suit-
able order for investigating questions on brain efficiency 
as they rely particularly on cognitive performance for 
survival. To date no studies have addressed to what extent 
smaller bodied primates may compensate for this disad-
vantage by opting for at least some increase in brain ef-
ficiency. However, this would arguably be the most likely 
situation in which to find evidence for increases in effi-
ciency.
 Among primates, callitrichids are the smallest bodied 
lineage with the shortest life history [compare Goldizen, 
1987; Robinson and Janson, 1987]. They face high preda-
tion risk as evidenced both by attack rates and high levels 
of predator-related vigilance as well as avoidance behav-
iour [Goldizen, 1987]. In contrast, their sister taxa, the 
Cebidae, comprising the capuchin and the squirrel mon-
keys, have 7–13 times bigger bodies and a 3–4 times lon-
ger life expectancy [Rowe, 1996], indicative of a lower ex-
trinsic, predator-related mortality, particularly in the ca-
puchin monkeys. Callitrichid monkeys therefore fit the 
case of a primate genus unable to afford brain size en-
largement, and thus one in which we may find evidence 
of increases in efficiency.
 In the simplest case and in the absence of variation in 
efficiency, an inability to afford brain size enlargement 
would mean that a species is less cognitively complex 
than a similar, larger-brained species. However, that this 
likely is not the case in callitrichids is shown by a recent 
meta-analysis that revealed that callitrichids systemati-
cally outperform their sister taxa, the larger-brained Ce-
bidae, in all cognitive tasks in the social-cognitive do-
main [Burkart and van Schaik, 2010]. In non-social cog-
nitive tasks, they performed at similar or lower levels. 
However, the direct comparison of callitrichids versus 
Cebines is highly conservative because cebines have 
brains that are 4–6 times larger [Herculano-Houzel et al., 
2007; Stephan et al., 1981] and absolute brain size is posi-
tively correlated with non-social cognition in primates 
[Deaner et al., 2007]. Therefore, similar or superior per-
formance in cebines compared to callitrichids tells us lit-
tle, as yet, about possible increases in brain efficiency. The 
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question rather is whether callitrichids perform better 
than would be expected for their brain size, compared to 
their sister taxa, in particular the much bigger-bodied 
and longer-lived capuchin monkeys.
 Here, we propose to assess brain efficiency by: (i) iden-
tifying a non-social cognitive measure that is closely cor-
related with brain size across primates and (ii) estimating 
brain efficiency by calibrating individual cognitive per-
formance in this task by that predicted for the species 
based on brain size.
 A good starting point for identifying a non-social cog-
nitive measure closely correlated with brain size is the 
meta-analysis by Johnson et al. [2002]. They identified a 
global cognition factor ‘g’, derived from a Bayesian meta-
analysis of 27 primate species and across 9 non-social 
cognitive paradigms. ‘g’ correlates well with various brain 
size measures, with overall brain size providing the best 
fit [Deaner et al., 2007]. In the present study, using John-
son’s ‘g’ for the direct comparisons of taxa is not possible 
because it is a statistically derived index and thus not em-
pirically measurable. Estimating brain efficiency requires 
comparing individual performance with that predicted 
based on the brain size of the taxon; an empirical para-
digm is therefore indispensable. Firstly, we aim at deter-
mining which single empirical approach, within those 
cognitive domains included in the meta-analysis, most 
closely estimates the theoretical global measure. Second-
ly, we aim at finding an empirical methodology within 
that approach that was similarly tested in multiple pri-
mate species, particularly those of interest for this study.
 A reanalysis of the data used by Deaner et al. [2007] 
indicates that of the cognitive paradigms included, rever-
sal learning provides the closest fit with the global cogni-
tion factor (see details in Methods section below). Rever-
sal learning is a pattern-discrimination paradigm with 
the key element of a reversal of reward contingencies. It 
thus measures cognitive flexibility in terms of the ability 
of the subject to let go of a previously learned discrimina-
tion and shift to an alternative solution. This finding fits 
well with the recent consensus that general cognitive per-
formance, at least in the non-social domain, has much to 
do with flexibility and the ability to let go of old solutions 
and find new ones [Byrne, 1995; Gibson, 2001; Lefebvre 
et al., 2004; Roth and Dicke, 2005]. According to Roth 
and Dicke [2005], such flexibility forms a general ability 
underlying performance in a broad array of tasks. Thus, 
reversal learning performance likely provides a good es-
timate of general cognitive performance. However, the 
reanalysis of the Deaner et al. [2007] data, while theo-
retically well supported, was based on an analysis of the 
studies themselves used for generating ‘g’. It is thus circu-
lar and independent confirmation is needed by demon-
strating the relationship between ‘g’ and reversal learning 
studies not included in the original meta-analysis.
 Of the many reversal learning measures available, 
transfer index (TI) [Rumbaugh, 1997] has the advantage 
of controlling for various sources of variation common to 
other measures that make direct comparison of data dif-
ficult. In particular, TI reliably controls for the level of 
learning achieved prior to reversal, bringing all subjects 
to an equal performance level before testing them on the 
cue reversal [Rumbaugh, 1971, 1997], and an essential el-
ement allowing for more accurate comparisons across 
studies. Additionally, the TI methodology has been de-
scribed in great detail [Rumbaugh, 1997] so that replica-
bility is assured and data from different labs may confi-
dently be compared. Furthermore, reliable TI data are 
available for numerous primate species, including mul-
tiple capuchin individuals [Delillo and Visalberghi, 1994; 
Beran et al., 2008]. However, to our knowledge, none us-
ing a comparable methodology has been reported for any 
member of the callitrichid family to date.
 Thus, the aim of the present study is to place the brain 
efficiency of common marmosets  (Callithrix jacchus) in 
relation to that of their sister taxa with the lowest preda-
tion pressure, the capuchin monkeys [data from Beran, 
pers. commun.; Delillo and Visalberghi, 1994]. We pre-
dict that even though in absolute terms the capuchin 
monkeys may well outperform the marmosets, the latter 
may show higher performance relative to their brain size. 
In order to do so, we first confirm that reversal learning 
and specifically the TI methodology is a reliable and good 
empirical estimator of non-social cognitive ability in 
non-human primates. We then measure transfer indices 
in a large sample of common marmosets  (C. jacchus)  as 
representatives of the callitrichids, and compare their ab-
solute and relative performance to their sister taxon.
 Materials and Methods 
 Does Reversal Learning, and TI in Particular, Reliably 
Estimate General Cognitive Ability ‘g’? 
 Transfer Index 
 The TI is a measure used to quantify performance in reversal 
learning paradigms. It is measured in terms of the number of cor-
rect choices in a pattern discrimination task relative to a set num-
ber of conducted trials [Delillo and Visalberghi, 1994; Rumbaugh, 
1997; Beran et al., 2008]. On achieving the pre-determined learn-
ing level in an initial discrimination task, the rewarded contin-
gencies are reversed and performance under these conditions is 
measured over a set number of trials. Commonly, TI is calculated 
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by placing the reversal performance relative either to a low (67%) 
or a high (84%) initial association level.
 The somewhat arbitrary choice of percentage is the result of 
the original testing methodology [Rumbaugh, 1971] which for 
reasons of comparability was maintained in subsequent studies. 
The former corresponds to performance slightly above chance 
and reflects a very weak association formation between reward 
and pattern, with the subsequent reversal of reward contingencies 
likely requiring little more than weak extinction. The latter re-
flects a strong association requiring more active inhibition of the 
pre-potent response in order to obtain the reward in the reversal 
situation. It is thus possible that the two different pre-reversal cri-
teria tap into different cognitive processes rather than reflecting 
different ends of the same process. The TI is calculated as follows 
for both high and low levels of pre-reversal learning [Delillo and 
Visalberghi, 1994; Rumbaugh, 1997; Beran et al., 2008]:
 TI = reversal performance (%)/pre-reversal performance (%)
 Comparative Analyses 
 In order to independently confirm whether the reversal learn-
ing paradigm predicts ‘g’ reliably, we searched the literature for 
studies on reversal learning tasks generally and TI specifically. 
We searched the databases ‘ISI Web of Knowledge’, ‘PubMed’, 
‘PrimateLit’ and ‘PsycINFO’; reversal learning studies included 
 in the Deaner meta-analysis were excluded. Wherever invasive 
methods or other experimental manipulations where used, we 
only collected the data for the control group. For reversal learn-
ing, data for each primate taxa in each study were converted into 
‘mean per cent correct’ [(mean trials (100%) and mean errors 
(100% – per cent correct)] as studies used and reported different 
total numbers of runs and errors. Studies for which this was not 
possible were excluded due to lack of comparability. The reversal 
learning measure and TI values were compared separately to ‘g’ 
to avoid circularity. Reversal learning studies were limited to the 
primate genera for which TI data were available to increase com-
parability.
 Twelve primate species were found in which TI has been mea-
sured:  Gorilla, Pongo, Pan (without the bonobos),  Hylobates, Cer-
copithecus,  Miopithecus ,  Lemur and  Microcebus  [Rumbaugh and 
Gill, 1973; Wilkerson and Rumbaugh, 1978],  Macaca  [Washburn 
and Rumbaugh, 1991],  Cebus ,  Saimiri [Rumbaugh and Gill, 1973; 
Delillo and Visalberghi, 1994; Beran et al., 2008] and  Callithrix 
[Strasser et al., this study]. For all species, TI values for both high 
and low levels of association formation prior to reversal were 
available.
 Additionally, we found 24 publications on reversal learning for 
these primate genera for which it was possible to extract a value 
for ‘mean per cent correct’. Unfortunately, many publications re-
ported their data in such a way that it was not possible to convert 
it into a percentage. These publications had to be excluded as they 
were not in any way comparable. A total of 40 measures emerged 
from these twenty-four articles (sometimes more than one ex-
periment was conducted for a certain study or more than one of 
our primate genera was subject in the study) which were collapsed 
into one weighted average value per genus ( table 1 ).
 TI in Common Marmosets 
 Subjects and Maintenance 
 A total of 14 adult common marmosets in four family groups 
housed at the Primate Station of the University of Zürich were 
tested, ranging in age from 2 to 6 years. The groups lived in stan-
dardized cages (2  ! 2  ! 1 m) containing a sleeping box, a water 
dispenser, an infra-red lamp (150 W), a rack to hold food bowls 
and a standard branch arrangement. The floors of the cages were 
filled with a layer of mulch that was turned and wetted weekly. 
The light regime consisted of daylight, and additional electric 
light from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. and UV light (300 W) from noon to 
 12: 30 p.m. Animals had free access to an outdoor run on a daily 
basis from April to October. This access was inhibited during the 
testing sessions. Husbandry regimes for all animals were identi-
cal. A morning meal of mealworms, gum and porridge was fol-
lowed shortly before noon by a main meal of chopped fruit/veg-
etables and, on non-test days, by a small treat consisting of egg or 
a nut at 1 p.m. Water and monkey chow were provided ad libitum. 
Table 1. R eversal learning, TI and global cognition measure ‘g’ 
values for 12 primate genera
Genus Reversal 
learning
TI low TI high g
Callithrix 66.34 0.69 0.58 1.22
Macaca 67.55 0.86 0.80 –0.55
Pongo 70.00 0.9 0.88 –1.75
Cercopithecus 57.70 0.7 0.68 –0.39
Lemur 49.50 0.6 0.47 0.75
Cebus 61.90 0.67 0.6 –0.19
Saimiri 64.00 0.62 0.6 0.94
Microcebus 42.40 0.62 0.28 0.96
Gorilla 67.00 0.9 0.9 –0.96
Hylobates 54.30 0.7 0.58 –0.11
Miopithecus 49.60 0.7 0.32 1.53
Pan 65.00 0.76 0.78 –1.66
R eferences for reversal learning studies: Callithrix [Ridley et 
al. 1981, 1984; Domeney et al., 1991; Dias et al., 1997; Pryce et al., 
2004]; Cebus [Crawford, 1962; Goulart et al., 2005]; Cercopithecus 
[Rumbaugh and Arnold, 1971; Jentsch et al., 2002; Lee et al., 
2007]; Gorilla [Patterson and Tzeng, 1979]; Hylobates [Rum-
baugh, 1971]; Lemur [Rumbaugh and Arnold, 1971]; Macaca [Ma-
hut, 1971, 1972; Pieper and Skeen, 1975; Essock-Vitale, 1978; Gaf-
fan and Harrison, 1984; Gaffan et al., 1986; Anderson et al., 1996; 
Arnsten et al., 1997;  Sanchez et al., 1998; Voytko, 1999; Wilson 
and Gaffan, 2008]; Microcebus [Joly et al., 2006]; Miopithecus 
[Rumbaugh, 1971]; Pan [Schusterman, 1962]; Pongo [Essockvi-
tale, 1978]; Saimiri [Rumbaugh and McQueeney, 1963].
Global cognition ‘g’ values from: Johnson et al. [2002], Ander-
son et al. [1996], Arnsten et al. [1997], Crawford [1962], Dias et al. 
[1997], Domeney et al. [1991], Essock-Vitale [1978], Gaffan et al. 
[1984, 1986], Goulart et al. [2005], Jentsch et al. [2002], Joly et al. 
[2006], Lee et al. [2007], Mahut [1971, 1972], Patterson and Tzeng 
[1979], Pieper et al. [1975], Pryce et al. [2004], Ridley et al. [1981], 
Ridley et al. [1984], Rumbaugh et al. [1963, 1971], Rumbaugh 
[1971], Sanchez et al. [1998], Schusterman [1962], Voytko [1999], 
Wilson and Gaffan [2008].
 TI references are given in the text.
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On test days mealworms and the treat were provided after the test, 
generally towards 4 p.m. Thus, animals used in the tests were not 
food deprived which also reduced hunger-induced motivational 
differences between individuals.
 All tests were conducted in a separate testing room in which 
the test cage was located. Animals entered this testing enclosure 
via a PVC tube which ran into the adjacent room containing the 
home cages. Animals voluntarily entered these tubes and the test-
ing room and were not directly handled. Individuals were famil-
iar with the testing room and enclosure, having been given the 
opportunity to explore and play there freely. During testing the 
pair or group of animals was called into the waiting enclosure of 
the test cage, visually isolated from the actual testing area, and 
individually allowed over for the actual test procedure ( fig. 1 ). The 
original research reported in this study was performed under 
guidelines established by the National Veterinary Office of Swit-
zerland and licensed to be performed by the Veterinary Office of 
the Canton of Zürich.
 Apparatus and Procedure 
 Animals were initially habituated to a wooden presentation 
board containing two food wells, and to the fact that rewards 
could be obtained from the wells (apparatus with measurements; 
 fig. 1 ,  2 ). Subsequently, individuals were encouraged to move a 
square of wood to reveal the baited well. Finally, the baiting was 
hidden from the individual by placing a large visual barrier be-
tween the animal and the presentation board; only one of the two 
wells was randomly baited, but both wells covered by a square of 
wood.
 For the actual test, ten pairs of visual discrimination patterns 
were used, consisting of black on white or white on black geomet-
ric figures (pattern pairs and sequence used;  fig. 3 ). Each animal 
received the same sequence of pairs of patterns and in each pair 
the same randomly chosen pattern was termed the initially re-
warded discriminand (S+). Only black and white patterns were 
used to avoid bias, as it has been shown that callitrichid individu-
als may have either a dichromatic or trichromatic visual system. 
Thus, different colours may be easier for certain individuals to 
 see and discriminate [Hunt et al., 1993; Jacobs, 2007].
 Individuals were tested a maximum of one session per day, con-
sisting of a total of 11 trials in which they were able to pick one of 
the two covered wells. The choice of 11 trials was made to ensure 
high levels of motivation and because this corresponds to the num-
ber of trials suggested and used by Rumbaugh [1971] as well as in 
the studies by Delillo and Visalberghi [1994] and Beran et al. [2008]. 
A trial consisted of the pulling back of the presentation board, the 
placement of the upright visual barrier to hide baiting, the baiting 
of the pseudo-randomly determined well and re-covering of the 
wells with the patterned squares of wood. This took approximately 
15–20 s. If successful, animals were given time to consume the re-
ward. If they were incorrect, the next trial was started. If an animal 
refused to choose, the trial was recorded as a refusal after 1 min and 
the next trial was begun. If an animal refused to choose three times 
in a row in a given session, the testing was terminated for that day. 
Termination occurred in less than 5% of trials.
 Identical covering of the wells was ensured by always employ-
ing the following procedure: squares were placed, two-handed, 
over the widest part of the well such that an equal excess of the 
square extended right and left of the well (visual fit, in the region 
of 2 mm on either side), then the square was moved forward, again 
two-handed, to fit tight with the front of the presentation board. 
Patterns were printed on paper, with overlap, so that they could 
be attached to the underside of the squares with tape. Thus, only 
the pattern was visible to the animal and not any part of the tape.
 In the early problems (pattern pairs 1–3), animals were aided 
during the acquisition of the discrimination in that if they failed 
to choose the correct pattern for four consecutive trials, the indi-
vidual was also allowed to uncover the second well during the 
same trial. The choice, however, was recorded as incorrect. The 
position of the S+ was pseudo-randomized (not more than three 
consecutive trials in the same location) using computer-generated 
random number lists. As TI performance has been shown to be 
unrelated to the speed of the initial acquisition but rather to how 
strongly the discrimination is learned [Rumbaugh, 1997], the aid-
D B
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 Fig. 1. Experimental setting showing the 
testing cage consisting of a waiting enclo-
sure (A), opaque visual barriers (B), con-
necting tunnel (C) and testing enclosure 
(D). Additional enclosures (E) were not 
used in this study. 
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ing explained above is unlikely to have any effect on TI perfor-
mance as it affects primarily the speed of acquisition and degree 
of learning being controlled for in any case. Indeed, aiding had no 
influence on the performance of the marmosets in this study (see 
Results section). To avoid cueing of the individual, the experi-
menter pushed the presentation board within reach of the animal 
with bimanual, symmetrical movements and placed her hands by 
her side afterwards, avoiding direct eye contact with the subject 
and either of the covered wells.
 Once a criterion of at least 7 correct out of 11 was achieved, 
corresponding to the lowest learning criterion suggested by Rum-
baugh [1971], the reversal session was conducted on the same or 
the next day. The decision was made based on the motivation 
shown by the animal. Motivation was taken into consideration 
because there is increasing evidence that lack of motivation can 
lead to reduced performance producing a falsely low indication of 
the individual’s cognitive capabilities [Addessi, pers. commun.]. 
Thus, if after reaching criterion the individual still showed great 
interest, indicated by alert sitting at the front of the enclosure and 
focused attention on either the board, the patterns or the experi-
menter, the reversal was conducted. However, if the animal 
showed indications of sinking motivation, indicated by increasing 
bouts of inattention or moving away from the testing board to-
ward the exit, testing was conducted the next day. In these latter 
cases, prior to the reversal, individuals were tested on the original 
discrimination in three ‘reminder’ trials during the test day. 
These three trials were included in the calculation of pre-reversal 
performance. This did not have any significant effect on perfor-
mance (see Results sections).
 In the reversal phase, 11 trials with the reversed reward con-
tingency were run. The first served to signal the reversal of con-
tingencies and only performance on the subsequent 10 was used 
to calculate the TI. No help was given to subjects during any re-
versal trials or any of the 3 reminder trials. In sum, the test pro-
cedure was identical to that of Rumbaugh [1971] including the use 
of 11 trials as the basic ‘unit’ with which to measure pre-reversal 
performance and the use of 64% (7 correct out of the 11) as the 
lowest learning level for which reversal was conducted.
 Data Coding and Analysis 
 Each session was videotaped and the choice (correct/incor-
rect) by the individual for each trial noted. The trial notes were 
double checked using the video footage in which choices were 
straightforward to determine, requiring the animal to move to the 
left side of the enclosure, or the right. There were no ambiguous 
cases. TI for each individual and for each problem was deter-
mined across the 10 problems. TI (low) was calculated based on 
performance on problems in which pre-reversal performance was 
7 or 8 correct out of the 11, and TI (high) based on a pre-reversal 
performance of at least 9 correct out of 11.
 Analyses were conducted using SPSS 16.0 and JMP 7.0. Con-
tinuous data were tested for normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff) 
and equality of variances (Levene) and where possible parametric 
statistics were applied.
C
D
1
2
300 mm
i
60 mm
65 mm
ii
2
300 mm
1,200 mm
60
0 
m
m
300 mm
 Fig. 2. Side view of testing enclosure (D) 
and connecting corridor (C) with details 
of testing apparatus: (1) Visual barrier for 
use during inter-trial re-setting of presen-
tation board (2). Presentation board with 
wells (2i) and discrimination patterns (2ii). 
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 Capuchin Monkeys 
 For the capuchin monkeys, we used the data from Delillo 
[1994] and Beran et al. [2008, pers. commun.]. The experimental 
design for the common marmosets was modelled as closely as 
possible after these studies. Thus, with the exceptions below, the 
methods for both species were identical. The main difference was 
that the marmosets discriminated between pairs of black and 
white patterns rather than between colourful, three-dimensional 
objects. For the capuchins the objects were baited with peanuts, 
candy or sunflower seed, depending on the preference of each 
subject. A choice was scored when the individual manually se-
lected and moved one of the objects (in capuchins) or one of the 
patterned squares (marmosets).
 The Beran data consisted of a large number of discrimination 
problems (over 50 in all cases) conducted for each of the individu-
als, and in some cases the reversal was conducted at lower levels 
of learning than the commonly used 67%. To assure comparabil-
ity, we used performance in the first ten discrimination problems 
in which at least 67% pre-reversal performance was reached.
 Comparing Brain Efficiency 
 Brain efficiency was assessed by correcting the effective task 
performance of each individual by the species value for this task, 
as predicted by a comparative analysis across all primate genera 
for which TI data is available. The analyses were based on TI 
(high) which turned out to explain the largest proportion of vari-
ation in ‘g’ (see Results section). In a first step, the predicted TI 
value for both marmosets and capuchins was generated via a com-
parative analysis of the TI against brain size across the 12 primate 
genera. This produced a regression line reflecting the predicted 
values for each species in this task based on their brain size ( fig. 4 ). 
The TI data for the 12 genera used to generate the predicted values 
came from the sources cited in the section above.
 Absolute brain sizes (endocranial volumes) were taken from 
Isler et al. [2008]. To control for phylogenetic relationships, inde-
pendent contrasts were calculated using Mesquite [Maddison and 
Maddison, 2007] using the phylogeny from Bininda-Emonds et 
al. [2007]. Predicted TI values were computed both including and 
excluding the value for common marmoset from the present 
study (see Results section). Excluding this value from the com-
parative analysis provides a more empirically rigorous test, while 
including it is statistically more exact.
 In a second step, the effective deviation of marmoset and ca-
puchin individuals’ mean TI (high) task performance from the 
species predicted performance value was calculated by subtract-
ing the latter from the former. In effect, the residuals of individ-
ual performance from the species mean were computed. Thus, 
efficiency was estimated as the degree to which individuals aver-
age performance across 10 tasks deviated from the expected per-
formance in this task based on brain size measures alone. A t test 
was then performed on the data, comparing the efficiency values 
for the  Callithrix individuals with those of the capuchins. All tests 
were two-tailed.
 Results 
 Does Reversal Learning, and TI in Particular, Reliably 
Estimate General Cognitive Ability ‘g’? 
 Both reversal learning (r 2 = –0.604  *  , p = 0.037) and TI 
were correlated with ‘g’, but TI explained more of the 
variance in ‘g’. TI based on a high level of initial acquisi-
tion, arguably requiring more complex inhibitory pro-
cesses, was more strongly associated with ‘g’ (TI (high): 
r 2 = –0. 850, p  ! 0.000; TI (low): r 2 = –0. 750, p = 0.005). 
Explaining one third more of the variation in ‘g’, TI (high) 
appears to more accurately measure general cognitive 
ability.
 Not only do reversal learning paradigms show a very 
good fit, but using a highly controlled methodology such 
as TI results in an enormous increase in predictive value. 
This confirms the finding of Deaner (unpublished) and 
also shows that using a clearly defined methodology re-
moves much random error. 
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 Fig. 3.  Visual discrimination patterns used in the test. 
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 TI in Common Marmosets and Capuchin Monkeys 
 On average, the marmosets required 28 trials to reach 
criterion and there was no correlation between the trials 
required for reaching the pre-reversal criterion and rever-
sal performance (with TI: rho = –0.3, p = 0.738; with per 
cent correct reversal: rho = 0.001, p = 0.991). This sample 
of common marmosets showed a TI (low) of 0.695 and a 
TI (high) of 0.582. Pre-reversal criterion had a significant 
negative effect on TI when controlling for the potential 
effects of an individual as a random factor and reversal 
problem as a covariate (F = 9.337; p = 0.003, dF = 1).
 Neither individual (F = 0.313, p = 0.976, dF = 13) nor 
cumulative problem number (representative of a learning 
to learn effect; F = 0.060, p = 0.808, dF = 1) had a signifi-
cant effect. Over the ten problems, there was no significant 
difference in TI (low and high) between the sexes (low: t = 
0.340, dF = 13, p = 0.740; high: t = 0.834, dF = 13, p = 0.421, 
n = 14), breeding status (low: t = –0.214,  p = 0.831, dF = 
13; high: t = –0.182, p = 0.859, dF = 13, n = 14), and there 
was no correlation with age (low: Pearson R 2 = –0.134,
p = 0.678; high: R 2 = –0.203, p = 0.601, n = 14).
 In capuchins, a clear effect of pre-reversal criterion 
was also found (F = 6.821, p = 0.011, dF = 1), with animals 
performing more poorly in reversals of previously more 
strongly learned pattern discriminations. In contrast to 
common marmosets, capuchins show a clear effect of in-
dividual (F = 11.585, p  ! 0.000, dF = 1) as well as a learn-
ing to learn effect (F = 18.185, p  ! 0.000, dF = 1), with 
animals performing better on reversals carried out in lat-
er problems. The sample for the analysis above was lim-
ited to data from only the 5 individuals from the Beran 
dataset because no sufficiently detailed data are available 
for the 4 subjects from the Delillo [1994] Capuchin data-
set. The limited capuchin dataset (n = 5) precludes a 
meaningful analysis of sex and age differences.
 In the marmosets, conducting the reversal on the same 
or the next day produced no significant differences in re-
versal performance when controlling for pre-reversal cri-
terion as a covariate and individual as a random factor 
(the latter included to control for pseudo-replication ef-
fects; F = 0.573, p = 0.871, dF = 13).
 Reversal performance at the lowest level of pre-rever-
sal learning was significantly higher than that at higher 
levels when controlling for individual differences (F = 
4.517, p = 0.036, dF = 1). Additionally, performance be-
tween the lowest level of learning and higher levels were 
not correlated (marmosets: R 2 = –0.181, p = 0.535, n = 14; 
capuchins: R 2 = 0.214, p = 0.584, n = 9).
 An overview of each marmoset subject’s performance 
in every single discrimination, including the criterion 
achieved, reversal performance and trials to criterion is 
listed in  table 2 .
 Comparing Brain Efficiency 
 Figure 4 shows the correlation between TI (high) and 
brain size (endocranial volume, converted to the natural 
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 Fig. 4. Least-squares regression of TI (high criterion) vs. Ln brain 
size across primates (n = 12 primate species, R 2 = 0.594, p = 0.001) 
common marmosets (star) exhibit a relatively higher TI for their 
brain size than capuchins (large dot). 
 Fig. 5. Boxplot of the difference between observed and predicted 
TIs (high criterion) for common marmosets (n = 14 individuals) 
and tufted capuchins (n = 9). The two species differ significantly 
(Student’s t = –2.447, p = 0.026). The boxplot shows the median 
value, interquartile range and the tenth percentiles for each spe-
cies. 
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Individual Sex Problem Total 
trials
Total 
errors
Criterion 
errors
Reversal
criterion
Reversal
errors
Reversal
perfor-
mance
TI
Gambia F 1 21 14 4 0.64 4 0.6 0.94
2 11 7 4 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
3 11 7 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
4 21 14 4 0.64 4 0.6 0.94
5 41 22 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
6 31 17 2 0.82 4 0.6 0.73
7 44 24 2 0.82 6 0.4 0.49
8 50 30 1 0.91 6 0.4 0.44
9 11 8 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
10 16 10 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
Gondor M 1 11 9 2 0.82 4 0.6 0.73
2 21 14 4 0.64 8 0.2 0.31
3 62 29 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
4 110 49 3 0.73 4 0.6 0.82
5 11 7 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
6 11 7 4 0.64 4 0.6 0.94
7 78 36 2 0.82 6 0.4 0.49
8 21 14 4 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
9 11 9 2 0.82 6 0.4 0.49
10 58 31 3 0.73 4 0.6 0.82
Jamuna F 1 19 12 4 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
2 11 8 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
3 11 8 3 0.73 3 0.7 0.96
4 23 15 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
Juniper M 1 23 13 4 0.64 8 0.2 0.31
2 25 10 4 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
3 12 4 3 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
4 23 8 2 0.73* 6 0.4 0.55
5 59 25 0 1* 4 0.6 0.6
6 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
7 33 19 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
8 11 3 3 0.64 4 0.6 0.94
9 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
10 33 16 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
Kalibase F 1 11 4 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
2 11 2 2 0.82 7 0.3 0.37
3 11 2 2 0.82 5 0.5 0.61
4 11 1 1 0.91 3 0.7 0.77
5 53 13 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
6 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
7 11 4 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
8 11 4 4 0.64 2 0.8 1.25
9 11 4 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
10 11 3 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
Table 2. I ndividual performance in the reversal learning task (TI) for common marmosets tested in this study
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Table 2 (continued)
Individual Sex Problem Total 
trials
Total 
errors
Criterion 
errors
Reversal
criterion
Reversal
errors
Reversal
perfor-
mance
TI
Kaliper M 1 70 33 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
2 11 4 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
3 55 32 3 0.73* 2 0.8 1.09
4 11 4 4 0.64* 4 0.6 0.94
5 11 4 4 0.64* 8 0.2 0.31
6 55 29 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
7 11 3 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
8 11 4 4 0.64* 8 0.2 0.31
9 11 3 3 0.73* 7 0.3 0.41
Kalium F 1 76 36 3 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
2 48 25 0 1 9 0.1 0.1
3 42 27 2 0.73* 7 0.3 0.41
4 55 25 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
5 44 26 4 0.64* 7 0.3 0.46
6 33 16 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
7 62 34 2 0.82 6 0.4 0.49
8 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
9 11 4 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
10 11 4 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
Kant M 1 22 11 4 0.64 2 0.8 1.25
2 19 7 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
3 44 20 2 0.82* 7 0.3 0.37
4 11 4 4 0.64* 7 0.3 0.47
5 55 28 2 0.82 2 0.8 0.98
6 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
7 33 16 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
8 33 16 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
9 11 1 1 0.91* 7 0.3 0.33
10 11 4 4 0.64* 7 0.3 0.47
Kantor M 1 11 3 3 0.73 7 0.3 0.41
2 53 25 3 0.73 3 0.7 0.96
3 45 17 2 0.82* 4 0.6 0.73
4 39 20 2 0.82* 5 0.5 0.61
5 33 13 2 0.82* 5 0.5 0.61
6 22 8 3 0.73* 4 0.6 0.82
7 11 4 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
8 22 7 1 0.91* 7 0.3 0.33
9 66 29 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
10 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
Kape F 1 39 14 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
2 11 3 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
3 11 3 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
4 11 3 3 0.73* 3 0.7 0.96
5 22 10 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
6 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
7 44 21 2 0.82* 7 0.3 0.37
8 33 12 2 0.82* 8 0.2 0.24
9 22 7 2 0.82* 9 0.1 0.12
10 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
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Table 2 (continued)
Individual Sex Problem Total 
trials
Total 
errors
Criterion 
errors
Reversal
criterion
Reversal
errors
Reversal
perfor-
mance
TI
Kapi M 1 36 17 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
2 11 3 3 0.73 8 0.2 0.27
3 55 24 3 0.73* 6 0.4 0.55
4 11 3 3 0.73* 4 0.6 0.82
5 53 21 3 0.73* 4 0.6 0.82
6 77 41 3 0.73* 6 0.4 0.55
7 33 15 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
8 11 2 2 0.82* 6 0.4 0.49
9 26 12 4 0.64 8 0.2 0.31
10 11 4 4 0.64* 6 0.4 0.63
Kapo M 1 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
2 4 0.64* 7 0.3 0.47
3 11 4 4 0.64 2 0.8 1.25
4 11 3 3 0.73 4 0.6 0.82
5 11 2 2 0.82* 5 0.5 0.61
6 64 41 1 0.73 8 0.2 0.27
7 11 3 3 0.73 6 0.4 0.55
8 29 13 4 0.64* 7 0.3 0.47
9 25 11 3 0.82 6 0.4 0.49
10 11 4 4 0.64 2 0.8 1.25
Karmelo M 1 16 5 3 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
2 21 5 3 0.73 4 0.6 0.31
3 83 55 2 0.82 6 0.4 0.41
4 11 4 4 0.64* 4 0.6 0.94
5 43 21 3 0.73* 7 0.3 0.41
6 76 40 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
7 44 22 3 0.73* 5 0.5 0.68
8 44 26 4 0.64* 4 0.6 0.94
9 11 4 4 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
10 44 27 0.64* 5 0.5 0.78
Karmon M 1 26 9 2 0.82 3 0.7 0.85
2 11 4 4 0.64 7 0.3 0.47
3 38 19 4 0.64 6 0.4 0.63
4 11 4 4 0.64 5 0.5 0.78
5 35 19 4 0.64 9 0.1 0.16
6 11 3 3 0.73 3 0.7 0.96
7 33 16 4 0.64 8 0.2 0.31
8 44 20 4 0.73* 3 0.7 0.96
9 44 17 3 0.73* 8 0.2 0.27
10 55 31 4 0.73* 6 0.4 0.55
I ndividual = Name of subject tested; Total trials = trials from 
beginning of problem until criterion is achieved; Total errors = 
wrong choices made during total trials; Criterion trials = trials in 
which criterion performance is achieved; Criterion errors = wrong 
choices made during criterion trials (maximum 4 in order for a 
minimum 64% performance to be achieved); Reversal criterion = 
percentage performance, based on number of errors during crite-
rion trials (* denotes problems for which reversal testing was con-
ducted on the next day rather than on the same day); Reversal 
errors = errors made during 10 reversal trials (excluding the first); 
Reversal perfor mance = percentage correct choices during rever-
sal trials.
 Measuring Brain Efficiency Brain Behav Evol 2012;80:26–40 37
logarithm). Species-predicted values are represented by 
the regression line. The regression has been calculated 
including ( fig. 1 ) and excluding the marmosets (values for 
both are listed above). For both, independent contrasts 
were computed (including marmosets: p = 0.0387; ex-
cluding: p = 0.0521).
 Species predicted values indicate the TI (high) that 
would be expected for a species based on their brain size, 
and are as follows:
 – For capuchins: 0.56 (regression including common 
marmosets); 
 – For capuchins: 0.55 (excluding common marmosets) 
 – For marmosets: 0.39 (regression including common 
marmosets); 
 – For capuchins:  0.37 (excluding common marmosets) 
 To identify whether the TI (high) of common marmo-
sets deviates more strongly from the species-predicted 
value compared to that of the capuchin monkeys, we 
compared TI (high) value residuals of individuals of both 
common marmosets (n = 11) and tufted capuchins (n = 
9). The results show that common marmoset individuals 
have a significantly higher residual from the value pre-
dicted for their brain size than tufted capuchin individu-
als (t = –2.447, p = 0.026;  fig. 5 ). This holds even in the 
more statistically conservative, but less empirically rigor-
ous, case of using predicted values based on a regression 
including marmosets (t = –2.268, p = 0.037).
 Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to assess whether adaptive 
pressure on brain efficiency can be expected where a spe-
cies faces a constraint on further brain enlargement de-
spite clear benefits accruing from high cognitive perfor-
mance. Callitrichid monkeys arguably face strong con-
straints on brain size increases due to high predation risk 
and the concomitant effects of life history on brain size.
 Based on the finding of a surprisingly high cognitive 
performance of callitrichids compared to cebines in the 
social domain, our prediction was that common marmo-
sets, faced with large constraints on brain size increase, 
show enhanced brain efficiency and cognitive perfor-
mance above what would be expected based on brain size 
alone. We found that this was indeed the case; common 
marmosets perform significantly better than predicted 
for their brain size compared to their larger sister taxa, 
the capuchins.
 In order to reliably show this, we firstly provided in-
dependent confirmation that the reversal learning para-
digm is a good empirical estimator of general cognitive 
ability. In particular TI using a high level of initial asso-
ciation formation showed a considerably closer fit with 
the global cognition measure than TI (low) or reversal 
learning more generally. This may provide support for 
the contention that the two different pre-reversal criteria 
tap into different cognitive learning processes. Indeed, 
the fact that performance at low levels of learning was not 
correlated with performance at higher levels in both com-
mon marmosets and capuchins supports the idea that 
different cognitive processes are involved. Arguably, the 
extinction of an association may be more relevant for re-
versing weak associations such as formed during TI (low), 
while active inhibitory processes may emerge as strong 
associations are formed during TI (high). However, to 
date this remains speculative but provides a good starting 
point for further research into this question.
 The TI performance of common marmosets tends to 
be higher compared to reversal learning studies in calli-
trichids from earlier decades, even though methodolog-
ical differences preclude a direct comparison [Deaner et 
al., 2007]. However, our reassessment is consistent with 
results reported by Gaudio and Snowdon [2008] on cross-
dimensional reversal learning in cotton-top tamarins 
 (Saguinus oedipus) , where individual performance was 
found to be surprisingly high. This, together with the re-
sults of the meta-analysis presented in Burkart and van 
Schaik [2010] is consistent with the idea that some en-
hancement of brain efficiency has taken place within this 
lineage.
 Obviously, additional studies comparing relative cog-
nitive performance including more callitrichid species 
and different cognitive paradigms are necessary to fur-
ther confirm this conclusion. However, the question aris-
es of how such an increase in brain efficiency may be ex-
plained? Particularly, questions arise about the nature of 
the benefits that enhanced cognitive performance pro-
vides for marmosets, which would provide the selective 
pressure needed to enhance efficiency.
 The increase in socio-cognitive performance found in 
the meta-analysis of Burkart and van Schaik [2010] can 
be attributed to the cooperative breeding system of the 
callitrichids. Broadly defined, cooperative breeding re-
fers to reproductive systems in which individuals other 
than parents help to care and provide for offspring [Gar-
ber and Leigh, 1997; Hrdy, 2009]. While callitrichids 
show a strong degree of cooperative breeding, their sister 
taxa engage in significantly less allomaternal care [Perry, 
1999; Fragaszy et al., 2004]. Shared care and provisioning 
is associated with behavioural propensities such as in-
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creased social tolerance, a tendency to pay attention to 
 the whereabouts and behaviours of group members 
and spontaneous pro-sociality [Burkart and van Schaik, 
2010]. These propensities can explain their increased per-
formance in many socio-cognitive tasks, but how perfor-
mance in non-social cognitive tasks may be affected is 
less straightforward.
 Obviously, cooperative breeding per se does not re-
quire advanced cognitive abilities given its occurrence in 
very diverse lineages, including primates and other mam-
mals, birds, fish and even insects [Clutton-Brock, 2002]. 
However, the proximate regulation of helping behaviour 
is likely to vary between lineages, as a function of the kind 
of helping behaviour involved and the original cognitive 
organization that was present before a given lineage 
 adopted a cooperative breeding system. Among primates, 
a candidate proximate process that might have been en-
hanced is inhibitory control, which is arguably required 
by callitrichid caregivers for the successful active provi-
sioning of infants with high-value foods that requires 
them to inhibit their response to eat the food themselves 
as well as in many situations in which they show high lev-
els of social tolerance.
 Inhibitory control has also been argued to be a major 
component of reversal learning performance [Santos et 
al., 1999; Kralik et al., 2002; Kralik, 2005] and thus a com-
ponent measured by the TI task. While this premise ap-
pears reasonable, a direct correlation between reversal 
learning and inhibitory control still needs to be shown. 
However, if the better than expected performance of 
marmosets in reversal learning is due to better inhibitory 
control, they should also perform better than expected 
for their size in inhibitory control tasks, such as detour 
reaching [MacLean et al., 2012], delay tolerance [Addes-
si et al.; Amici et al., 2008] or reversed reward contingen-
cy [Shifferman, 2009].
 A further aspect is that a trait complex such as alloma-
ternal care and its associated motivational and cognitive 
propensities is likely to be largely innate and rely less on 
individual ontogenetic learning in small-brained coop-
erative breeders such as callitrichids because it is evolu-
tionarily so essential for the taxa. This would mean that 
specific essential abilities are selectively enhanced and, 
being strongly canalized, shown in all individuals to a 
similar degree. If cooperative breeding and its underlying 
propensities are indeed largely innate, less variation be-
tween individuals and, in this particular case, the sexes 
and age classes is expected in any associated measure. 
This is exactly what is found for the TI values in common 
marmosets, in contrast to the capuchins where strong ef-
fects of the individual are found as well as clear learning 
to learn effects, both indicative of a more individual 
learning-based cognitive performance.
 On current evidence, it is not possible to decide wheth-
er the observed increase of efficiency in non-social con-
texts is a by-product of cooperative breeding or due to 
selective pressures acting on physical-cognitive domains 
directly, due to ecological reasons for example [Stevens et 
al., 2005]. Future work will first have to provide further 
evidence for a relative increase of performance in non-
social contexts in callitrichids. To further evaluate which 
of the possibilities raised above might be responsible for 
such a pattern, additional data from other primate species 
that differ in ecological conditions or breeding systems, 
yet face similar constraints on brain size increase, are in-
dispensable.
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